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Schneider Electric China: Implementing an Enterprise
System to Support Rapid Development
The difference between hell and paradise is whether you have engineering people or not.
(Jean Longeot; Director of Support Operations)
On December 9, 1999, Yves Cizaire, manager of MIS, had just returned from a steering committee
meeting where a difficult decision had been made. After having successfully implemented SAP’s
ERP software package R/3 in the head office and two distribution centers using a phased
implementation strategy in which the different functional parts of the software would be introduced
one at a time, they would change their implementation strategy to a “Big Bang” approach in which all
modules would be implemented simultaneously for implementing the system in the first of their seven
joint ventures. Schneider China was in the midst of a transformation process which would put them
well ahead of their competitors in the enormously dynamic Chinese market. Glancing over the
endless flights of Beijing’s new blocky high-rises, Yves Cizaire wondered what lessons could be
drawn from the first two phases or their ERP implementation project for successfully realizing their
business vision for China.
Company background
The history of Schneider Electric1 goes back as far as to the year 1836 when two brothers named
Adolphe and Eugene Schneider acquired mines, forges and foundries in Le Creusot, France. After
1870 the firm moved into the manufacture of weapons and infrastructure and became one of Europe’s
leading suppliers in these fields. Further diversification followed at the turn of the century, including
investments in cement and electricity. As the company expanded its activities beyond Europe, it also
started taking interest in the Chinese market as early as 1895. However, beginning in the 1920s a long
period of steady decline punctuated by World War II was only stopped in 1949 when the company
was reorganized and refocused on non-military products in the fields of construction, steel, electricity
and nuclear power. Despite Charles de Gaulle’s declaration in 1959 that Schneider had acquired a
position of “leading the national economy”, a new process of deterioration set in which could only be
halted in 1981 by another effort of reorganization and refocusing. The company shed a substantial
part of its businesses while acquiring three firms active in the electricity and industrial control and
automation markets. In 1996 the firm had repositioned itself as a world-class manufacturer in these
fields owning four renowned brands, Merlin Gerin, Modicon, Square D, and Telemecanique (see
Exhibit 1 for Schneider Electric’s global leadership positions and Exhibit 2 for consolidated income
statements 1996-1999). In 1999, the group’s name was changed into Schneider Electric. Henri
Lachman, who became CEO in 1999, commented:
Our new name and logo make the completion of a vital process: Schneider’s strategic refocusing
on electricity.
Schneider Electric in China
After the (re-)opening of China in 1978 by Deng Xiao Ping, then prime minister, Schneider made its
first tentative step into this promising market in 1979 by building China’s first high voltage
                                                     
1 All information in this section is taken from Schneider Electric’s web sites (www.schneider-electric.com)
which, in turn, draw on “Schneider, l’Histoire en Force” by Tristan de la Broise and Félix Torres, published in
1996 and distributed by Editions Jean-Pierre de Monza, Paris.
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transmission line. Its commitment became more visible with the erection of its first joint venture in
Tianjin in 1987, the huge harbor city neighboring Beijing, manufacturing low voltage electric
equipment. Since then, it has rapidly expanded its operations in China which, by now, comprise
seven joint ventures, three distribution centers, and 19 sales offices. In 1995, Schneider Electric
consolidated its several activities by creating a holding company, Schneider Electric (China)
Investment Co., Ltd. (see Exhibit 3 for a time line of Schneider Electric’s expansion in China and
Exhibit 4 for an overview of Schneider Electric’s geographical coverage of China).
In China, as elsewhere in the world, Schneider Electric’s two core businesses are electrical
distribution and industrial control and automation, with approximately 70% of sales being generated
by its electrical distribution business. Jean Longeot, director of Schneider Electric China (Schneider
China) Support Operations, explains:
The electrical business [ranges] from power generation to the end user of electric power, including
applications. And we are in between. We are not in power generation and we are not installing
something at the places or systems integrators. … We are in the business of products with
industrial customers, not the mass market. With the product defined as such, we are no. 1
worldwide and also no. 1 in China. … The customers might be systems integrators or equipment
manufacturers and they sell to the end user which is either the factory or the building or the
private person. ... They also might have contractors in between. So this is a very complex [supply
chain] and the technology oriented part of it is on the products and that is where we are. And we
are only there, which is a little specific.
This business, together with the field of industrial control and automation, involves the manufacture
and distribution of a huge number of electrical components (see Exhibit 5 for a sample of Schneider
Electric’s products). Their total number goes beyond one hundred thousand of which, however,
roughly 1500 account for 80% of sales.
Schneider Electric’s business in China developed rapidly with sales growth rates between 1994 and
1999 averaging 21% (see Exhibit 6 for the development of Schneider Electric’s sales in China). This
rapid development creates a unique challenge as described by Jean Longeot:
Sometimes, when we look at the potential of China, we are frightened; it is so huge, and we still
have glasses [for] let’s say thousands [but] we cannot read correctly millions. And this is [still]
misleading because what we are looking at … is less than 10% of China which is already as big as
Japan; and of course, the huge potential is also in the 90%. In this 90% we know that there are
tremendous opportunities—we may not see them. So I would say the major challenge is, not to
miss opportunities. It is exactly the opposite of what you have in the rest of the world. In the rest
of the world, every opportunity is known and we have to fight against the competitors. But in
China, [this] is not so much the issue; we may not even see that there is an opportunity. If we see
it, we can be very successful.
To recognize and exploit these opportunities implies the necessity of fast decision processes. This,
however, is often difficult in China given the traditional structure of joint ventures which, originally,
required that the foreign partner and the Chinese partner (usually a state owned entity) share equity
more or less equally. Thus, decision making is often hampered by the need to obtain agreement from
both partners. Yves Cizaire, director of MIS, describes how Schneider China tried to solve this
problem:
We started our first joint venture with 50.01% [of equity] and arrived at a deadlock. When we
started our second joint venture in 1994, we held 60% of equity. We planned to make this
transaction with partners who have the same business as we and it was a mistake, I should say.
When you have to make business decisions, you need to be able to make it fast. And if you have a
partner with 40% who does not agree too much on what you do, he can block you. So now, we are
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trying to go to 70, 80, 95%. This is the only way to deal with it. Then we can invest when and as
we want. We discovered to have a partner who is a real, active partner is difficult. … We prefer to
have partners who make some money but let Schneider decide on the business. … We don’t create
a new joint venture with less then 80% ... Now we have the ability to manage as we want, to make
decisions, because the partner has less risk and so does not care that much. We have a global view
of the Chinese market; the partners only see their specific market. This can cause very different
views on business decisions.
Notoriously, multinational firms doing business in China are plagued by the difficulties involved in
recruiting and retaining competent personnel. It is often assumed that Chinese employees, especially
professionals, are opportunistic job hoppers with little sense of loyalty for their firms. Jean Longeot
begs to differ:
I believe [this] is not true, although it is what is visible. What is true is that Chinese people like to
be a member of a community, but there are many conditions. They have to be [able to be] proud of
their community every minute of their life. Even one hour of lack of pride is already an intense
suffering. The well educated ones … would love to have a long term relationship with a company.
I would even say [that] because they are expecting so much from the company, they can be so
deeply frustrated that they will quit. If you can find the secret of [enabling them] to continue to
have a positive feeling of belonging, you [get a] tremendous team. This is my strong believe. …
We have been mislead by Hong Kongnees; they are … trained by the British with salaries closer
to Americans than to Europeans; and Hong Kongnees where the ones who taught us, as foreigners,
what it is like to be Chinese. I think they were wrong in almost everything. … I was so surprised
when I saw candidates, very high level ones, not beginners; sometimes, they were so enthusiastic
about joining the team that they were not even discussing salaries. They were not even interested
to know. Some of them accepted lower salaries—so how does this fit with what the Hong
Kongnees were saying? This is the real difficulty, how to make it worth for [Chinese employees]
to stay a long time.
The China Logistic System-Project (CSL)
Before coming to China in mid 1996, Jean Longeot was vice president for support operations and
logistics worldwide. Sending ‘over-sized’, high caliber managers to China was a deliberate decision
since it was felt that, in order to match the rapid development of business in China, it was necessary
that managers develop this business which would match its magnitude in a period of five years ahead.
This was in line with a strategic decision made by Schneider Electric in 1993 to significantly reduce
the influence of strategic business units in favor of country management. As a consequence,
Schneider China changed the way its joint ventures were organized drastically. Whereas before the
joint ventures were reporting to central SBUs, they were now integrated in a holding structure and
reporting to the country manager Harry Hellawell (see Exhibit 7 for Schneider Electric’s organization
structure worldwide and Exhibit 8 for Schneider Electric’s organization structure in China). As Jean
Longeot keeps saying:
“We are not an aggregation of joint ventures, but a company with joint ventures”.
The mission of Jean Longeot was to create the operational infrastructure supporting this new strategy.
Deeply inspired by the TQM2 philosophy, he set up a team of engineers working in the newly created
department ‘Support Operations’ whose task was to look at the total of Schneider Electric’s China
operations from a process perspective. Based on their analysis, a strategic decision was made to
                                                     
2 Total Quality Management: Inspired by Japanese management methods, TQM emphasizes the process
perspective of quality management rather than the “American” focus on quality control and inspection.
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centralize all sales and distribution activities in China. Before, each joint venture would sell and
deliver its products independently to its customers which implied that the same customers would deal
with several of Schneider Electric’s joint ventures as if they were independent firms. As Jean
Longeot explains:
The initiative started from the department which is in charge of engineering processes, and if you
are looking at the processes of a company, you find that the logistic process is urgent, is very
important. So it was obvious. It’s not a very original strategic decision; as soon as you have people
really looking at processes, they come to this decision [to centralize sales and distribution
activities], and we were the ones to implement it.
Implementing this strategy required to build strong logistic competencies which was the one thing
Longeot considered to be of utmost importance upon his arrival in China:
The HR strategy which I implemented is the thing which I am proud of. I took very high level
people, highly educated, [but] inexperienced. With an experience of a few years so they are
mature (they know what it [means] to work in a complex environment), but they had no
experience in logistics, I could not find them. So I said to the HR department, hire excellent guys;
I don’t care in what they are excellent, but I want them to be excellent. And these people learned
so fast … We provided them with a lot of training, particularly the engineering [people]—and
there is another success factor, which is on each site we are starting I always separate the job
between the people in operations and the people who are in engineering; the people in engineering
were on the site, so were hit by the same little accidents every day, but their duty was that it would
not come back again, and the duty of the operations people was to serve the customer every day.
Having these two teams permitted them to succeed. Starting a distribution center in every country
is terribly dangerous; the normal situation in the beginning of a distribution center is total chaos.
And we avoided it. After two months the quality of service was high. There was no chaos. And I
think it was due to these talented Chinese people. Also, there was nobody to tell them how it was
done in France or in the US - so, no temptation to copy. …
It was decided that, rather than having just one distribution center, there should be at least three. The
first one was located in a Shanghai Free Trade Zone and started operations in April 1998. It focused
on importing products which were not made by any of the Chinese joint ventures (about 20% of total
sales in China). In 1999, a second one in Beijing was opened. Longeot says that
.. this one is really the image of what we want to have ultimately; it is starting [to] distribute
imported products via [the distribution center in Shanghai] but they stock it in Beijing and the
products from joint ventures and we go to the point where there will be not any stock of finished
products in joint ventures. The stock of the joint ventures is in the logistics centers. So the strategy
is we load a very powerful logistic system which is taking orders, stocking, procuring …
[delivering, and invoicing].
In 2000, a third distribution center has been opened in Guangzhou (Kanton). In spite of having
created these distribution centers, Schneider China would not replace its existing network of 300
distributors covering the whole country. As Longeot explains:
… [their] roles are different. The distributor is there to make a product available in two minutes.
Our duty is to make it available, potentially, in one day.
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Implementing this strategy required that Schneider China replaces its existing logistics information
system with an integrated system, i.e. an enterprise system or, as it is commonly known, an enterprise
resource planning system.3
The ERP implementation decision
When Schneider China began to implement the new strategy, its information systems infrastructure
was characterized by a high degree of fragmentation. Most of the joint ventures were relying on a PC-
based planning system called Fourth Shift which had been implemented with the support of the MIS
department under the direction of Yves Cizaire. The distribution center in Shanghai used an
internally developed logistics package called SDS (Schneider Distribution System) and the finance
department used another PC-based system (CIEL) for financial reporting. This fragmented IT
landscape reflected the historically grown organization structure in which joint ventures operated
independently, loosely held together by a collection of financial controls.
The decision to implement a full-fledged ERP system has been a gradual one. Upon his arrival in
September 1997 in Beijing, the new finance director, Phillippe Degrave, found a note on his desk left
by his predecessor saying that his first decision should be which new accounting software the firm
should use. Phillippe Degrave explains:
At that time, the holding company was not so big and we were using a PC-based accounting
software from France and obviously it was getting too small … So we had to change to another
software … [The logistics issue] had been in the background. We knew that sooner or later … we
would have a logistics [center]; but it was not clearly in the picture yet. … We knew that we
would need a software package for the holding [and] we knew that we would need a software
package for this logistics entity but we didn’t know yet when.
However, the logistics project was setting the frame for choosing the finance software solution:
In my mind, it was not about finance, but it was about giving Schneider China an MIS bone which
would allow us to grow. (Phillippe Degrave)
Yves Cizaire comments along similar lines:
The basic need had been to accommodate growth in a more efficient way. Without that [an ERP
system], we could not grow.
In more specific terms, the necessity to implement an integrated ERP system stemmed from the
managerial integration of business activities in China rather than from the centralization of its logistic
operations. It would have been possible to handle logistical operations by the distribution centers
with the SDS software. But it would not have been possible to obtain financial information for all
Chinese business activities on a level of detail required for managing Schneider China “as a company
with joint ventures” rather than an “aggregation of joint ventures”, i.e. as an integrated business
entity. Jean Longeot describes that situation as follows:
If there were no special needs from finance, we would have kept SDS which is fit to our need. But
because there was finance, we needed an integrated one, at least between finance and logistics.
And, of course, we knew that once we would have it, we would love to have it in the JVs. The JVs
would not love it but then we would go on the way which is what we’ll do but it will take years.
                                                     
3 On ERP systems, see Austin, Robert D.; Escalle, Cedric X.; Cotteleer, Mark  (1999): Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP), Technology Note #9-699-020.
Schneider Electric China
6
The ERP implementation process
Vendor selection
As for the vendor selection, the decision has been made in a step by step fashion too. In December
1997, Degrave and Cizaire investigated three packages which were on a short-list provided by
Schneider Electric headquarters (as the ERP implementation project was started as a finance project,
Longeot was not directly involved in this decision). One system was excluded because it was felt that
it was not a truly integrated system. A second system was considered not to be sufficiently supported
locally. SAP’s R/3 system was thus chosen as it was highly integrated and fully supported locally
although all involved managers thought it to be the most complex one and the most difficult one to
implement.
Thus, when the finance module of R/3 (see Exhibit 9 for an overview of the R/3 structure) was being
implemented in the first site (the distribution center in Shanghai), the final decision regarding the
ERP vendor was still pending. Yves Cizaire elaborates:
In the beginning of 1998 we implemented FI [the R/3 finance module] and then saw how it was
running and if it was possible to make it. … In April 1998 I asked SAP to make a plan for Greater
China. When we started with SAP, we thought this is a tool for the next five to ten years. In May I
prepared how we are going to implement this tool. But first I needed to know how SAP was
[running]. I presented the plan to the GM in the beginning of June. When we started with
[finance], we [already] planned to implement MM/SD [the logistics modules], but the JVs didn’t
know. Only when we were sure that it was workable and the GM decided it was possible, we
informed them. The [JVs] were not involved in this decision. It was not a shared decision but a
centralized decision.
An incremental approach
This method of vendor selection already implied a phased implementation strategy, i.e. the
implementation of the several modules one after another; moreover, one module would not be
implemented in all sites simultaneously; rather, specific sites were selected to serve as test
installations (“pilots”) and successive implementation activities would be initiated contingent upon
prior experiences in these pilots (see Exhibit 10 for an overview of implementation phases and sites
and Exhibit 11 for the functional scope within the modules to be realized in Schneider China).
Thus, in January 1998, the financial modules of SAP’s R/3 were beginning to be implemented in the
Shanghai distribution center at the same time as SDS was implemented to support this distribution
center’s logistical operations although it was already clear that later the logistics modules of R/3
would replace the SDS system.
The main reason for this approach was that the two projects, CSL (China Logistic System) and ERP,
were about to be implemented simultaneously. Adopting a phased implementation strategy would
reduce the risk involved in creating a new distribution center from scratch while implementing an
Enterprise System since SDS was tailor-made for Schneider Electric, protecting Schneider China
from bad surprises. However, the strategy was not undisputed internally, as Phillippe Degrave points
out:
We started as a finance only project because in the meantime we finally decided to do this logistic
project in the first half of 1998; but they also decided to [first] not use SD [the R/3 distribution
module] but to use [SDS]. … I tried to convince Longeot to start an integrated SD/FI project …
because what I understood [is] SAP is … one big thing [and] if you only take a part you have to
cut the links … it’s not like a zipper, it’s knitted [together] …
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The next step was to implement the R/3 finance modules in the holding office including regional
sales and representative offices since they belonged, in legal terms, to the holding company. Next, the
second distribution center in Beijing was selected as a pilot for the R/3 logistics modules because it
was physically closer to the head office so that it could be monitored more closely. Here, however,
building the new distribution center and implementing the new logistics modules of R/3 went hand in
hand.
The team
The first phase of the implementation process had been driven by an expatriate with 20 years of
experience in finance and considerable experience in China, helped by a small internal team of two
MIS people and three people from finance. Her professional experience allowed her to evaluate the
solutions suggested by the external consultants who, for the first phase, had been hired from SAP,
against a benchmark of what should be possible with a powerful financial software tool. According to
Phillippe Degrave
… she knew exactly what she wanted ... She had the feeling of what SAP could give because most
of the time when you ask something they [the consultants] say it is not possible. But you know it
must be possible because a software of that kind must do that. But the first reaction is often that it
is not possible. She had already worked with very powerful tools [so] she knew that this answer
was not very satisfactory. She said you cannot say that to me. I want that you find a solution. So
after three or four days the consultants finally came back with a solution.
However, she left in July 1998 so Degrave put a Chinese manager in charge of the project who,
however, he felt was not very confident in himself. So he sought some external support which was
then provided by a consultant from PwC (PricewaterhouseCooper) who would come two to three
times per month for a period of six months, i.e. until the finance module had been implemented in the
head office as well as in the regional sales and representative offices.
Through this way, Schneider China developed a good working relationship with PwC so that
Schneider China asked PwC to help them for the second and the more complex phase of the project,
the installation of the logistics modules. However, Schneider China wanted to build its own ERP
implementation competence in order to reduce dependency on external consultants and lower costs.
Therefore, PwC provided some guidance but the main consulting job has been performed by so-called
internal consultants who belong to the MIS department and who specialized each on one R/3 module
(see Exhibit 12 for the composition of the logistics implementation team).
Specific to this project was the choice of team members who would represent the functional
departments. Generally, these roles would be performed by knowledgeable users, so-called key users.
Due to the ERP implementation project being embedded in the wider CLS project, however,
Schneider China charged an engineering team, the so-called OMC (order management cycle) group
located within the Support Operations department, with the task of analyzing and redesigning
Schneider China’s logistical process. Yves Cizaire explains the role of the OMC group, who were
also called super key users, as follows:
The OMC group has been part of the mechanism to support this interaction and communication
[between the users and the MIS people]. For example, when we prepared the process flow, it was
with the OMC people. OMC was going to see what the … users were doing and then working with
MIS. In fact, we consider the OMC people as the key users, a [kind of] super key user. Because
we think that these people have to do … the next implementation, they can learn what is the
process [like], have an idea of the process and can make it to be sped up together with the
consultant.
Jean-Francois Asseur, the PwC co-project manager, comments on potential problems resulting from
this choice of key users:
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It could have [caused some problems] but it didn’t because in fact the [super] key users spent a lot
of time working in Shanghai [and] Beijing; they are all part of the logistics group headed by Mr.
Longeot and so the communication was very good … the risk could have been that they could
have been disconnected … as project managers we want to get the best people from the client site
in our project not only because we are selfish but in order to make the right decisions; the people
need to know the business and in order to be able to sign off the people need to have the trust of
the department; so if you recruit a junior team … who doesn’t have the trust of [the] department
then you take the risk that the design will not be smart … or be rejected; … It sometimes happens
that you have to fight with the organization to get the right people. Here it was a bit different
because even if they were not real key users they had all the skills and then they knew the business
simply because of the communication and the structure of the logistics team.
However, Phillippe Degrave voices some concern about this choice of key users:
Something which is often a problem with SAP and something which very much concerns me
today is that I wouldn’t want to use ... my Ferrari in a Hutong4 ... means that I wouldn’t want to
use SAP as it should not be used and I am afraid that with very young and inexperienced people,
people who have no idea of what this software should do, that we will use it on a very low level
basis. We should use SAP to go one or two or ten steps further, to use it having in mind what will
be in 2005; ... sometimes I have the feeling they just don’t have that vision. So they try to solve
the issues of today ... having no idea of what will be in 2003 or 4 or 5.
The steering committee
The steering committee comprised the director of Support Operations, Jean Longeot, the finance
director, Phillippe Degrave, the MIS director, Yves Cizaire, and the senior PwC consultant, Jean-
Francois Asseur. Originally, the sales director had also been involved but his position was vacant
since June 1999. Albeit it was planned that the steering committee meets once a month, it actually
met only about every other month. Yves Cizaire describes the role of the steering committee:
The SC reviews all the issues. I present what is the status of the project and raise the issues which
I think should be discussed.
However, Phillippe Degrave considers the steering committee to be not properly performing as such:
The steering committee is not really working. It is not efficient. I don’t know exactly why. … It is
not working because we don’t make decisions. We are informed. For me a steering committee is
not an information center, it is a decision maker. And we are not making decisions.
In this context, Degrave mentions the one implementation problem that caused the biggest distortions
in the logistics operations, the so-called indent problem.
The “indent” problem
Once the scope of the project and the hardware architecture are defined, the main activity in any ERP
implementation process consists of customizing the ERP system (see Exhibit 13 for a description of
the hardware infrastructure of Schneider China’s ERP system and Exhibit 14 for a description of the
customization process). The main difficulty in customizing an ERP system is to ensure that the
required business processes can be efficiently handled by the system while, at the same time, making
use of the accumulated business process engineering knowledge embedded in the system. However,
frequently a gap remains between the processes as enabled by the software and the requirements of
the existing or desired business processes. Then, the costs of changing existing organizational
processes and structures regarded to be efficient have to be traded off against the benefits of having
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processes more in line with the system’s capabilities. Similarly, the costs of changing the software
have to be traded off against the benefit of having software which better fits specific business
requirements. In general, Schneider China has opted for changing the software in more cases than it
has chosen to change business processes. Li Zhong, the project manager for the ERP implementation
process, reflected on this trade-off:
We use SAP standard functions for only part [of our processes] and developed a lot of programs
by ourselves to enhance the standard functions and to fulfill our users requirements. … I think it
was a quite expensive experience. Maybe next time we will … try to use the standard functions
[more].
Specifically, one problem occurred which, according to Jean Longeot accounted for 60% of all
problems encountered in the implementation process. The problem concerns a specific ordering
process called an indent order. Degrave explains:
We also have very specific products that we won’t stock. When someone wants them, we will
order them specifically from France for this customer and when they arrive in our warehouse we
take them and ship them to this customer, this is called ‘indent’ in Schneider. … If that customer
finally doesn’t want the product, it will be scrapped, sooner or later. In SAP, when you order from
stock, it’s no problem. … . When it is an indent or a ”delivery to order” order, in this version of
SAP,5 the product doesn’t go to the stock. At the minute you receive it, it becomes a cost of goods
sold … as if it doesn’t go to your warehouse which, I guess, in Europe wouldn’t be a problem
because when we have that kind of order, we ship it immediately to the customer. But in China,
that’s not the case because we sell mostly by cash on delivery, so we only ship when we have
received the money. … So these indent products, they are stocked, … sometimes for months; if we
had used the normal process of SAP, they would not have been in the inventory but in the cost of
goods sold, but with no sales, so we would have had distorted inventories, wrong cost of goods
sold, wrong margins, wrong profits, wrong everything.
Upon the intervention of Degrave, a decision was made to use the ‘delivery to stock’ process rather
than the ‘delivery to order’ process. Longeot comments:
We made the choice ‘delivery to stock’ because when you are in the process ‘delivery to stock’,
everything which is in the warehouse belongs to you. Doing that, we lost the link between a sales
order and a purchase order. We wanted to be nice with finance, because we knew they suffered a
lot, they were never able to have the real value of their stock, which is criminal for finance people
…
Loosing the link between the sales and the purchase order implied that some customers could not be
supplied because their order got lost or the products ordered by them had been taken to fulfill another
order. In-time deliveries temporarily dropped from 95% to 87%. Initially, the problem had not been
that big. The new logistics system was first implemented in the Beijing distribution center where the
problem had already been identified. However, adding the orders of one joint venture to be
distributed via the new distribution center much sooner than originally scheduled worsened the
problems dramatically since orders from this joint venture included a higher share of indents than
was normally the case. The problem was finally solved by an additional batch program which has to
be run once a day but it took some time to sort out the difficulties which were created in the one week
in which the problem built up without having been solved.
                                                     
5 Schneider China hasn’t implemented the most recent version of R/3 because it was, at the time of
implementation, new and thus untested in the Chinese market. The trade-off decision described in the main text
does not have to be made in the successive versions of R/3, that is in versions higher than R/3 3.1H.
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Although this issue implied such far reaching consequences, it had never been discussed in the
steering committee. Jean-Francois Asseur explains:
This problem has not been brought to the steering committee per se but a steering committee
member was part of the working group [which was specifically set up to address this problem], the
financial manager was there, the MIS director was there, the logistics director was not there but he
delegated the distribution center manager to represent him. We didn’t wait for the monthly
steering committee meeting to resolve this issue but we brought the members of the steering
committee [into the decision process] because it was a significant decision that had to be taken by
the people from the steering committee.
Similarly, Degrave comments:
One reason for this is the speed of the implementation process. Compared to implementation
projects in Europe, this implementation had been very fast which also implies that one cannot
always wait for the next steering committee meeting to make an important decision.
However, with hindsight, Jean Longeot says that, if he had anticipated these problems:
I would never have accepted [this solution] … Customers are yelling. Just for … the quality of
analysis of margins it is not a good recipe to have customers suffer so much—and, logistics people
[spent] nights and weekends [to solve the problem]—they are tired, consequently one had an
accident last week ... Our team is close to the dangerous phase. We have not yet reached it but I
try to be very very careful …
The data conversion problem
The last step before ‘going live’ consists of transferring the data from the old system to the new
system, the so-called data conversion (see Exhibit 15 for an ERP implementation phase scheme
suggested by SAP’s ‘ASAP’ methodology).6 Apart from the technical intricacies involved in this
task, one possible problem which might pop up in this phase is the problem of data quality as it
turned out to be the case for Schneider China. In contrast to R/3, SDS allowed for a higher degree of
flexibility when entering data. For example, it was possible to ‘create’ an order (document) without a
link to a product reference. In R/3 this is not possible, the system wouldn’t continue to process the
order document unless such a link (a ‘reference’ as it is called) is established in the document.
Similarly, R/3 has a number of automatic controls for entering data, for example rebate data which, as
configured in Schneider China’s case, must not exceed 30%. In SDS, no such controls existed so that
frequently much higher values were entered. Accordingly, these data caused processes to stop in R/3
which would run smoothly in SDS. Thus, data conversion not only implies moving data from one file
into another and making sure that the structure of the data remains intact but also ensuring that the
contents of the data complies with standards required for running the new system, i.e. controlling the
correctness of data on the semantic level as well as on the syntactic level.
Given the sheer amount of data in any transaction system such as an order processing system, this
task can be daunting. Actually, the only way to do it, apart from checking each instance of data one
by one which would be prohibitively expensive, is to make a full-fledged test conversion, i.e. to move
the whole data base to the new system and run the system under real-world conditions before actually
‘going live’ or, as it is termed in Schneider China, ‘cut-over’. Schneider China didn’t do that because
of the time and effort implied in this task. Yves Cizaire reflects on this decision:
                                                     
6 Of course, if the firm moves from a purely paper based system to a computerized system, this step is not
necessary, as is the case for many Chinese firms and as it was the case for the Shanghai distribution center.
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When we prepared cut-over, we asked everybody “[are the tests] okay?” and everybody said “it is
okay, I am ready”. And we discovered that for the previous system the people know their small
part but they didn’t know what was wrong … We should have done a real conversion … we
didn’t; we made some test conversion but not a real one because that is very time consuming
because that would mean that you take all the team plus a big part of the heavy users on the
conversion; that could take one week. It is very difficult to get that amount [of resources] because
the people say they are ready and they are on their own work. We thought we could escape that
phase; it was a big mistake, my mistake, I should have forced [them].
In addition, while working on the data quality problem after cut-over, the MIS department didn’t
communicate enough with the users to inform them about the problem so they continued to enter data
in an, in terms of R/3, invalid format which aggravated the problem. Accordingly, one major lesson
which Yves Cizaire has learnt is:
[Stick to] a logical implementation [method], even under stress. When we had the data conversion
problem, we did not communicate to the users because we were under heavy pressure. So they
were already using the system and thus continuously creating new problems (because they did not
stop to do the wrong things). It took us one month to go out from that.
Project outcomes
Although some significant problems emerged in the implementation process, Schneider China has
succeeded in realizing its original plan, namely to create the “MIS backbone” required to support the
new strategy of centralizing all sales and distribution activities in China, i.e. to create a “company
with joint ventures” rather than being an aggregation of joint ventures, an organizational whole which
can be managed as one entity. The contribution of the ERP implementation had been to enable
Schneider China not only to handle the logistics involved in this project, this would have been
possible with the old system SDS either, but also to manage this entity from a business point of view.
That is, the integration of Schneider China’s logistics and financial system was at the very center of
this project and this integration is what has been achieved at the end of this phase of the project in
November 1999.
Moreover, project management targets have also been broadly met. Due to the “indent problem” and
the “data conversion problem”, the implementation in the Shanghai distribution center was one month
behind schedule. Given the speed of this implementation process (six month for the implementation
in the Beijing logistics center, five month for the Shanghai logistics center) and the magnitude of the
problems, this was not an easy feat. In addition, the implementation was “in budget”, meaning that
the problems could be successfully handled without increasing the resources devoted to this project.
Yves Cizaire comments:
Although I have implemented large information systems before, I expected to have some bad
surprises because everybody kept telling me that implementing SAP is very difficult and costly.
But I was quite happy [they didn’t come]. I think [SAP] is not so difficult to implement; it has the
same problems as all the other software [products]. …In China, the decision lead time is very
short. … When we had some problems, we should have foreseen them. It was not a problem of
SAP. It is all management and preparation …
Regarding the integration of finance and logistics, Phillippe Degrave comments on the outcome of
this project:
For Finance, the outcome is very satisfactory. Most of the objectives have been achieved.
Objectives had been the number of users online and extent and depth of financial information. For
example, now expenses can be looked up in real time for any category or site [included in the
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holding]. Before, each site [representative offices etc.] created financial data in Ciel on a PC
[based on Excel] which were consolidated monthly in an Access database. Moreover, now group
and statutory accounting are integrated [since different rules are used for the group and within
China there was much duplicate work before]. Finally, all evaluations should be consistent,
especially with regard to inventories.
Questioned about the possibility of increased control over joint ventures once they would have
implemented R/3 as well he remarks:
For Finance, one of the biggest advantages is to have a common language which is very difficult if
one uses several systems. For example, every JV has its own chart of accounts. The control, we
would have had anyway; but it makes discussion much easier. … In my mind, it is not about
increasing control. I do not want to be the big brother.
However, from a user perspective, some degree of dissatisfaction was noticeable. Although Li Zhong,
the project manager, claimed that users considered the system as convenient, Gong Lian, the SD key
user, thinks that end users have to manage an increased work burden as a result of the implementation
project due to the specific way in which the indent problem had been solved. Also, she says that
whereas in the Beijing distribution center, where users didn’t use another system prior to the
implementation, users are enthusiastic about the system, users in the Shanghai distribution center
regard it as more complex than their old system (SDS). Moreover, she reports that end users from the
distribution centers would have liked to be involved earlier in the project and would have preferred
more intensive training (they had received two weeks of training before cut-over administered by the
key users). Finally, she expresses some discontent with the consultants who, according to her
opinion, should have predicted the magnitude of the indent problem and lacked the expertise to solve
it satisfactorily. She comments on the solution which was finally implemented:
The end user is the victim of this decision. It is unfair for the end user.7
Future challenges
The next step will be to implement R/3 in all seven joint ventures. Senior managers anticipate some
problems which, however, they think can be overcome. Specifically, some general managers are
likely to resist the implementation of R/3 on the grounds that their degree of autonomy might be
decreased as a result. However, Degrave explains how Schneider China plans to overcome this
possible source of resistance:
We are not in a situation that we are blocked. We can start with those that are more open and that
is what we are doing. We have limited resources so we cannot do everything at the same time so
we can choose the JVs we start with ... we know that we have resistance but this is not yet a
problem. And at the time it will become a problem they will not be able to resist anymore. It will
be like a domino.
Probably a more serious source of resistance by the joint ventures, though, could be the fact that they
are going to loose control over sales and distribution once the strategy will have been fully
implemented. As Jean Longeot explains:
… it was said from the beginning [that sales and distribution will be centralized] but probably they
didn’t realize that we were serious. So, piece by piece it started. When you create a logistic
system, it’s positive; nobody is expecting that it is going to be better for almost everybody; but
when you have a logistics system, you find very quickly that you don’t need logistics in the JVs
                                                     
7 The problem had been solved by installing an upgrade of R/3 (version 4.5B) in May 2000 which can handle
both types of orders satisfactorily.
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anymore. We are at this point where they find, hey, we don’t need logistics anymore, what are we
going to do?
Finally, the success of the next phase of the implementation project would crucially hinge on the
motivation and expertise of the project team members. Schneider China’s goal was to establish a
small competence center of internal SAP consultants and business process experts. However, as
Phillippe Degrave remarks:
We know we are training people but ultimately they will use their knowledge to implement SAP
somewhere else. … We try to give them good salaries but you know you can always find
somebody who can put 20, 30 or 50% more on the table because when you want to implement
SAP the resource is key in China. We cannot pay them 50 thousand RMB. We try to give them
good salaries but I am sure they can find better ...
When Yves Cizaire pondered about these future challenges he wondered which lessons could be
learnt from the first two phases of the implementation project. The steering committee had just made
the decision to use a “Big Bang” implementation strategy for implementing R/3 in their first joint
venture although originally they had planned to use a phased implementation strategy as in the
previous phases. Which problems could be anticipated from this change in implementation strategy
and how to overcome them? More specifically, was it necessary to review fundamental decisions and
concepts of the implementation project such as the concept of the super key user, the role of the
steering committee, and the plan of creating a team of internal SAP consultants? How to motivate the
team members anew given their degree of exhaustion after the first two phases had been
accomplished? How to prevent them from leaving the company?
The implementation had been a remarkable success so far and has laid the foundation for building a
unique strategic position in the Chinese market which would take their competitors quite some time
to catch up. But fully implementing their strategy still required a long way to go.
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Exhibit 1: Global leadership positions in strategic business segments
Market
position
Transmission
and
Distribution
Low Voltage
Power
Distribution
Low Voltage
Final
Distribution
Industrial
Control
Programmable
Logic
Controllers
1 ABB Schneider Schneider Schneider Siemens
2 GEC-Alsthom Mitsubishi Siemens Rockwell Rockwell
3 Siemens Eaton ABB Siemens Schneider
4 Schneider GE GE Fuji Electric Mitsubishi
Source: Schneider Electric
Exhibit 2: Schneider Electric key financial data, 1996-1999 (in billion euro)
Year 1999 1998 1997 1996
Sales 8.4 7.6 7.2 6.7
Operating income 1.1 .85 .76 .59
Net Income .48 .41 .34 .21
Current Assets* 5.1 4.5 4.7 4.0
Total Assets* 10.3 8.3 8.6 7.8
Current Liabilities* 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.2
Shareholders’ Equity* 4.3 3.6 3.6 2.8
* As of Dec. 31
Source: Schneider Electric
Exhibit 3: Time line of Schneider Electric in China
1979: 1st extra high voltage transmission line in China: Ping Ding Shan Extra High Voltage
Licence.
1983: Tian Shui Telemecanique Contactors Licence (now expired).
1987: Establishment of first joint venture in Tianjin (TJMG).
1991-1993: Establishment of Merlin Gerin Representative office in Beijing and Shanghai.
Telemecanique Representative office in Beijing, Shanghai and Wuhan.
1994: Establishment of Schneider Wuhan technical training center, 4 Regional Offices.
1995: Establishment of Holding Schneider Electric (China) Investment Co., Ltd. and four joint
ventures (SSIC, SSPA, SSLVTA, SSG).
1997: Establishment of SBMV, SBLV joint ventures in Beijing. Establishment of Schneider
(Shanghai) Supply Company Ltd.
1999: Establishment of China Logistic System Beijing and Schneider Electric Low Voltage
(Tianjin) Co., Ltd.
2000: Establishment of a joint training & research center between Schneider Electric and
COACE of Tsinghua University. Establishment of SECI Guangzhou Branch Logistic
Center (DCGZ).
Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 4: Schneider Electric locations in China
• 3 Branch Offices
• 16 Regional Offices
• 8 Joint Ventures
• 3 Logistic Centers
• 1 Training Center
• More than 300 distributors
• 2300 staff
Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 5: Sample of Schneider Electric products
Medium voltage switchgear
Low voltage distribution product
A transformer for power generation
A circuit breaker
Source: Schneider Electric
Exhibit 6: Schneider Electric sales in China
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Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 7: Organization structure Schneider Electric
Chief Ececutive 
Officer
Sectretary of
Chief Executive Officer
Activities &
Technologies
Finance &
Controlling
HR & Corporate
Communication
International
Division
North American
Division
European
Division
French
Division
Southeast
Asia
African & Caribbean
Middle East & India
South Korea & Japan
Mainland China
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Sourth
America
Pacific
Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 8: Organization structure of Schneider Electric China, 1999
Harry Hellawell
Chairman & General Manager
Mu Jingtao
Legal Counsel
Liu Ke
Human Resources
Vacant
Marketing & Strategy
Phillippe DeGrave
Finance & Controlling
Jean Longeot
Support Operations
Tim To
Schneider Hong Kong
Zhang Zhong
Schneider Taiwan
Cao Wei
Electrical Distribution
Victor Chong
Engineering Products
George Wang
Industrial & Automation
Thomas Chang
SSIC
Zhu Hai
SSPDA
Patrick Wong
SSLVTA
Pierre Tabary
TJMG
Tim To
SSG
Xavier Merouze
SMBV
Alxex Khoo
SBLV
Jean Longeot
SSC
Xia Jianling
SEBS
SSIC: Schneider Shanghai Industrial Control Co., Ltd.
SSPDA: Schneider Shanghai Power Distribution Apparatus Co. Ltd.
SSLVTA: Schneider Shanghai Low Voltage Terminal Apparatus Co.
TJMG: Tianjin Merlin Gerin Co., Ltd.
SSG: Schneider Swire (Guangzhou) Electrical Equipment Co. Ltd.
SBMV: Schneider (Beijing) Medium Voltage Co., Ltd.
SBLV: Schneider (Beijing) Low Voltage Co., Ltd.
SSC*: Schneider (Shanghai) Supply Co., Ltd.
SEBS*: Schneider Electric (Beijing) Supply Co., Ltd.
* Distribution center
Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 9: The R/3 modules
Logistics Finance
Human Resources Cross-sectional
Applications
SD: Sales and Distribution
MM: Material Management
PP: Production Planning
QM: Quality Management
PM: Plant Maintenance
FI: Finance
CO: Controlling
TR: Treasury
PS: Project System
IM: Investment Management
EC: Enterprise Controlling
WF: Workflow Management
IS: Industry Solutions
HR: Human Resources
Source: SAP
Exhibit 10: ERP project phases and sites
Module Location Start time End time Partner
FI/CO Shanghai
distribution
center
1997.12 1998.4 SAP China
FI/CO Head office, four
representative
offices, Hong
Kong office
1998.4 1998.10 SAP China
SD, MM Beijing
distribution center
1999.1 1999.6 PwC, internal
consultants
SD, MM Shanghai
distribution center
1999.7 1999.11 PwC, internal
consultants
PP Tianjin joint
venture
1999.10 mainly internal
consultants plus
support by PwC
Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 11: ERP project scope
Phase I: FI/CO
• Customer Master, Vendor Master, G/L account
• Accounts Receivable
• Accounts Payable
• Fixed Assets
• Credit Management
• Internal controlling (costing, budget planning)
• A/P, A/R invoice interface for SDS
• HQ group information supply via interface with CIEL
Phase II: SD/MM
• Customer Master, Pricing, Material Master, Vendor Master
• Domestic and export order processing (order to cash) for sales and indent products
• Customer return, rebates payment
• Procurement for production and non-production materials
• Return to ventor
• BOM maintenance and MRP
• Cycle counting, scraping
• Inventory movement
• Transfers between plants
Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 12: The structure of the project team
Yves Cizaire
Project Sponsor
Li Zhong
Project Manager
J.-F. Ausseur
PWC Project Manager
Steering Committee:
Jean Longeot
Phillippe Degrave
Yves Cizair
Internal consultants:
Liu Jianguo (MM)
Chen Zebin (SD)
(Super) Key users:
Li Litong (MM)
Gong Lian (SD)
PWC consultants:
MM: 1
SD: 1
Song Cunxiang
Technical Engineer
Business Process Owners:
Xia Jianling (SEBS)
Yi Quangen (SSC)
Victor Wu
Finance Interface
Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 13: ERP technical infrastructure in 1999
Production Server
(Compaq), Beijing
Development Server
(IBM), Beijing
Backup Server
(Compaq), Beijing
Memory: 4 GB
Hard Disc: 216 GB
Processor: PIII 500
Memory: 716 MB
Hard Disc: 147 GB
Processor: PII 450
Memory: 2 GB
Hard Disc: 216 GB
Processor: PIII 500
WAN (leased line)
Bandwidth: 128 Kb/s
Backup (ISDN)
Bandwidth: 2x56 Kb/s
LAN:
Bandwidth: 10 Mb/s
Client
(Compaq)
Client
(Compaq)
...
Total: 64 clients in head office
and distribution centers
MB: Mega Bytes
KB: Kilo Bytes
Mb/s: Mega bits per second
Kb/s: Kilo bits per second
Source: Schneider Electric China
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Exhibit 14: Excerpt describing the process of configuring R/3
Everything is driven by the business process. The first thing is to identify the flow of information and
then, once you agree upon the flow of information, some big decomposition of the business process
[is done] … then you move transaction by transaction following the order of the business process;
let’s say if you think about a process like order to cash, you will start with the order creation. You sit
down with your customer and try to go through the order creation, the different screens, try to check
how the person will enter the sales order, which field should be mandatory, which fields should not
and that will drive the configuration behind … once you do that, what we call proto-typing or
scripting, you script the transaction, and at the end of this exercise you have your business flow
documented … which means that you could almost at this point start the system and really envision
how you will create a sales order in the system once you are live. On SAP, you have what they call
the reference model which shows you the different transactions per modules … You have the SD
module on the user side and you have the SD module on the configuration side and then you can use
that as a check list.
Source: Interview with J.-F. Ausseur, PwC senior consultant
Exhibit 15: ERP implementation phases as prescribed by the SAP implementation methodology
(ASAP: Accelerated SAP)
1. Project Preparation
• Ensuring support by all decision makers
• Building the team of internal and external consultants and users
• Training of project team members
• Defining of project scope (“scoping”)
2. Business Blueprint
• Documenting the company’s business requirements
• Set-up of the test system
3. Realization
• Customization/configuration of the system
• Fine-tuning
4. Final Preparation
• Training of end users
• System testing
• Data conversion
5. Go Live and Support
• Adaptation
• Upgrades
Source: SAP
